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 Palestinians back on the political stage? 
Dr. Martin Beck 
The Arab Spring significantly increased the coverage of Arab politics in 
international mass media. Yet, the “usual suspect” that regularly cap-
tures the headlines of world affairs in past decades—politics in the oc-
cupied Palestinian territories—has been remarkably absent from the 
headlines of reports on the Arab Spring. Yet, recently, the Palestinians 
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 n September 12, 2012, the New York Times reported on a week of major pro-
tests in different cities of the West Bank that were directed not (primarily) 
against Israeli occupation but its own government: mainly Prime Minister 
Salam Fayyad and, albeit to a lesser degree, President Mahmud Abbas.1 Less 
than two weeks later, on September 27, 2012, Mahmud Abbas delivered a high-
ly  covered speech at the 67th session of the General Assembly of the United 
Nations.2 He thereby emphasized that bilateral negotiations with Israel led to a 
deadlock and concluded that a Palestinian state should be established. Abbas 
announced to apply for an upgrade of the Palestinian status in the UN as a non-
member state. Between these two dates, the World Bank released a significant 
report on the fiscal crisis of the Palestinian Authority and economic prospects in 
the West Bank.3 In that report, the efforts of the Palestinian Authority to deal 
with the fiscal crisis are praised. Furthermore, in the report, Israel’s occupation 
policy is criticized for impeding Palestinian development and the international 
donor community is blamed for having fallen short of its financial commit-
ments to support the Palestinian Authority (PA). 
 
The three abovementioned pieces of information trigger important questions: 
Is a “Palestinian Spring” ahead? Did Mahmud Abbas turn to be a radical by 
asking the international community to upgrade the Palestinian status in the UN 
without prior consultations with Israel? Finally, why is the World Bank critical 
of Israel and the international community rather than of the PA which, in turn, 
is under pressure from its own constituency? These questions signify contradic-
tory developments that are to be dealt with in the present paper. 
 
The recent protests in the West Bank are significant. The scope of the protests 
was quite impressive both in numbers and geographical scope. Thousands of 
people demonstrated in the major cities of the West Bank such Al-Khalil (Heb-
                                                          
1 Isabel Kershner 2012: Spreading Palestinian Protests Focus on Leaders,in: New York Times 
September 10, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/11/world/middleeast/spreading-
palestinian-protests-focus-on-leaders.html?_r=0, retrieved on September 12th, 2012. 
2 The speech has been put on Youtube in full length and is available at: 
:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1sJXfQ7AyZU, retrieved on September 29th, 2012. 
3 The World Bank 2012: Fiscal Crisis, Economic Prospects. The Imperative for Economic Cohe-
sion in the Palestinian Territories (Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Commit-
tee), September 13, available at: http://unispal.un.org/pdfs/WBank09-2012_AHLCReport.pdf, 
retrieved on September 27th, 2012. 
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ron), Nablus, and Ramallah, which hosts the PA. The demonstrators shouted 
slogans of the Arab Spring, some demanding Mahmud Abbas to step down 
from office.  At the same time, the causes of the protests in the Palestinian terri-
tories were less political than economic, or rather, financial issues. When Salam 
Fayyad imposed austerity measures as a result of a severe budget crisis, the 
Palestinians, who already suffer from high unemployment rates and living 
costs in relation to salaries, directed their outrage against their government.  
Thus, a point can be made that the Palestinian protest—thus far—resembles the 
Middle Eastern pre-Arab Spring pattern of “bred riots,” rather than the revolu-
tionary movements in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria that demanded not less 
than regime change. Yet, one should be careful to trivialize the recent demon-
strations in the West Bank since  the major anti-regime movements in the Arab 
Spring were also, at least at the beginning, inspired by frustrations on the eco-
nomic performance of the ruling elites. Nevertheless, the fact that the Palestini-
an territories remained impressively silent during the heydays of the Arab 
Spring in 2011, and since the recent events have not reached the level in other 
Arab countries raises the question: Why so—particularly in the light of the fact 
that since the 20th century, Palestinians have been famous for being the most 
politicized people in the Arab world? 
 
The strategic situation between the West Bank society and its political leader-
ship is very different from other Arab nations. Due to prolonged occupation of 
Palestinians, whose territories were conquered by Israel in 1967, the authority 
of the PA is very limited. The scope of its activities was massively restricted al-
ready when launched as a result of bilateral negotiations in Oslo in 1993. Yet, in 
the first years of the Oslo peace process, hope prevailed among Palestinians that 
the final outcome of bilateral negotiations with Israel would be a Palestinian 
state.  Since 2010, however, there are few Palestinians left who are confident 
that there will be a Palestinian state as the result of negotiations with Israel. The 
Second Intifada, which started in 2000, already signified the termination of the 
Oslo peace process by the Palestinian people—whereas its leadership was still 
ready to occasionally resume rounds of bargaining with Israel, which all failed 
due to the extremely high degree of incompatibility of positions between the 
two sides. At the end of 2010, when Barack Obama publicly declared that he 
will not any more put pressure on Israel to commit itself to even a temporary 
settlement freeze, the curtain was drawn over the approach of achieving a Pal-
estinian state based on bilateral negotiations between Israel and the PLO. At the 
same time, by no means this was the end of the Palestinian aspirations of hav-
ing a state of their own. 
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In August 2009 Salam Fayyad had come up with a plan to build proto-state 
institutions based on principles of good governance, thereby creating a Palestin-
ian state, rather than talking about it in fruitless discussions with Israel. The 
Fayyad Plan was approved by the West since it appeared as an appealing pro-
Western counter-model to the rule of Hamas that had taken over political reign 
in the Gaza Strip in March 2007.The World Bank, that assisted and closely mon-
itored Palestinian state-building under the leadership of Fayyad, published a 
very positive progress report in 2011, which it confirmed in its recent Septem-
ber report: 
 
“(…) a year ago the World Bank reported (…) on its assessment of the institu-
tion building efforts of the PA noting that ‘In areas where government effec-
tiveness matters most – security and justice; revenue and expenditure manage-
ment; economic  development; and service delivery – Palestinian public institu-
tions compare favorably to other countries in the region and beyond’. That re-
port also noted that the institutions of the PA ‘… are reasonably effective, both 
by any absolute standard one might have, and especially in comparison to other 
countries, in the region or elsewhere.’ The institutional assessment of one year 
ago remains valid today.”4 
 
According to the World Bank, the main obstacle impeding sustainable 
growth in the West Bank is not the absence of good governance but the lack of 
private investment. Yet, does the engagement of the private sector remain low, 
despite a comparatively favorable political environment set by  effective proto-
state institutions of the PA in the West Bank?  To put the answer in a nutshell: 
Israeli occupation. To be more specific, the West Bank is still sub-divided ac-
cording to the Oslo formula in areas A, B, and C. Areas A and B comprise the 
major cities and villages of the West Bank that are governed by the PA (where-
by Area A and B differ insofar as internal security is a prerogative of the PA in 
Area A, whereas it is a task shared between the PA and Israel in Area B).5 Yet, 
although the vast majority of Palestinians live in Areas A and B, most parts of 
the West Bank territory—Area C— is still under full control of the Israeli occu-
                                                          
4 The World Bank 2012: Fiscal Crisis, Economic Prospects. The Imperative for Economic Cohe-
sion in the Palestinian Territories (Economic Monitoring Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Commit-
tee), September 13, p. 4. available at: http://unispal.un.org/pdfs/WBank09-
2012_AHLCReport.pdf, retrieved on September 27th, 2012. 
5An exception is Al-Khalil (Hebron) where major parts are still under direct Israeli control (as 
the whole of East Jerusalem). 
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pational regime. Area C does not only comprise all settlements and areas that 
are defined by Israel as relevant to its security, but also areas that cover most 
resources, particularly infrastructure (e.g. the roads connecting the Palestinian 
towns and villages with each other) and most of the natural resources (e.g. wa-
ter). Notwithstanding an Israeli policy oscillating between strict mobility con-
trols organized by military checkpoints and easing restrictions by partially re-
moving checkpoints and facilitating to pass them, the basic problem has re-
mained unchanged ever since the Oslo peace process in 1993: There is no geo-
graphic contingency for Palestinians in the West Bank and access to basic natu-
ral and technical resources is controlled by Israel. 
 
The leadership of the PA concluded from their successful proto-state build-
ing process in 2011 that a fully-fledged Palestinian state should be established. 
Since bilateral negotiations with Israel had failed, the PA intended to unilateral-
ly declare a Palestinian state and to ask the international community to recog-
nize it. For that purpose, Mahmud Abbas held a speech in the General Assem-
bly of the United Nations one year ago on September 23rd, 2011, in which he 
demanded full membership in the UN. Although the speech was well-received 
by Arab members and many states of the Third World, the US—backed by 
some of the most powerful members of the EU—had already previously made 
clear that they will veto full membership in the Security Council. 
 
Mahmud Abbas concluded from the incident to set his sights lower and an-
nounced to just go for an upgrade of the current status as “non-member observ-
er entity” to a “non-member observer state” – the so-called Vatican status.6Con-
trary to full membership, the Vatican status can be granted by a simple majority 
vote of the General Assembly, leaving no veto power to the US. On the one 
hand, this move of the Palestinian President was a confession of Palestinian 
powerlessness, on the other, it was consequent in terms of his approach of sym-
bolic policy. At the same time, it might improve the position of the Palestinians 
in the international system, particularly since the Vatican status could possibly 
lead to full membership in the International Criminal Court.7 
                                                          
6 Al-Jazeera: Palestinians mull observer status at UN, June 8th, 2012, available at: 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2012/06/201268223933362503.html, retrieved on 
September 15th, 2012; Al-Arabiya: Abbas to make bid on Sept. 27 to obtain U.N. status , trades 
blame with Hamas over unity deal,  September 8th, 2012, available at: 
http://www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/09/08/236855.html, retrieved on September 15th, 2012. 
7See BBC News Middle East 2012: Q&A. Palestinian bid for upgraded UN status, available 
at:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13701636, retrieved on September 30th, 2012. 




The current situation leaves all political actors involved in an awkward posi-
tion: Israel because it blocks the realization of Palestinian self-determination by 
recognizing a Palestinian state—although Mahmud Abbas has not been tired of 
recognizing Israel in the boundaries of 1949 as a legitimate state and Salam 
Fayyad has managed to establish fairly efficient proto-state structures; the Pal-
estinian Authority because it failed to deliver what its constituency has been 
demanding for decades—i.e. an independent Palestinian state. Since the PA fac-
es a parallel reign by Hamas in the Gaza Strip and a major budget crisis that 
already led to social unrest in the past weeks. Finally, the US—and the West in 
general— are placed in an awkward position because (even in light of a failed 
approach of bilateral negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians) it is not 
ready to support the request of Palestinian statehood by the pro-Western PA 
that has proven to be ready and capable of implementing an agenda approved 
by the West. 
 
When applying the perspective of stability, a strategy that could work in the 
short to medium run is to increase financial aid to the PA which would put 
them in a much better position to lower social unrest. This would also be conse-
quent insofar as the Oslo peace process, as it has been based on a systematic 
way of providing foreign aid to the Palestinians. Whether a Palestinian state 
with full territorial contingency controlling East Jerusalem, the West Bank, and 
the Gaza Strip—including a safe passage connecting the two latter areas with 
each other—would have a fair chance to develop a viable Palestinian economy, 
without constant influx of political aid, is a matter of dispute. However, there 
can be no doubt that under the condition of prolonged occupation, Palestinians 
are prevented from creating sustained growth sufficient to meet the expecta-
tions of its comparatively well-educated and highly-qualified people. Although 
this is common wisdom and even though the World Bank gave high marks to 
the PA, it should not be taken for granted that the PA will get what it needs to 
“tranquilize” the Palestinian people. Although the PA met the technical condi-
tion criteria for their state-building process, they failed—from the perspective of 
major Western donors—the political ones insofar as they dared to ask for 
recognition of a Palestinian state, without approval from Israel. Abbas will like-
ly be cautious enough not to ask for the Vatican status before US elections are 
held. In this case, there might be a chance for Abbas to convince Barack Obama, 
if re-elected, for green light for his approach. Since, the West—and even Israel—
have a strong interest in keeping a  moderate, pro-Western personal on the top 
of the PA, it will be most interesting to observe in the coming weeks and 
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months how and whether all sides—the West, the PA and Israel—find common 
ground for a continuation of their cooperation. 
